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SEEING LIKE BIG TECH
Security assemblages, technology, and the 
future of state bureaucracy
Félix Tréguer
In June 1831, a Frenchman, Alexandre Ferrier, sought to create the first privately-held 
optical telegraph line between Calais, in Northern France, and London. Ferrier was 
an adventurous entrepreneur who did not back away from bold ideas. The privately-
owned telecommunications infrastructure he set out to build would not only serve the 
interests of French industry barons willing to track stock prices in the financial capital 
of the world; it could also be of use for the diplomatic communications of the French 
government. The whole plan was risky but, after all, there was no law sanctioning the 
monopoly of the French state over telegraph networks.
To be on the safe side, Ferrier thought it was best to ask the government for an 
explicit authorisation. But Casimir Périer, then head of the French government, 
was hesitant as to what his answer should be. Yes, Ferrier’s proposal was unusual 
but, after all, many political and business elites agreed that the telegraph could be 
a boon for the emerging industrial revolution (Flichy 2009). Could the govern-
ment seriously consider meet that demand while keeping its monopoly over the 
telegraph? Many thought not.
Alphonse Foy – the man Périer turned to in order to make up his mind – 
had an entirely different view on the matter. As the newly-appointed Director of 
the Telegraph Service at the Ministry of Interior, Foy wrote a letter that offered 
a more-than-tepid response to Ferrier's project. “Mr. Ferrier's request is entirely 
inadmissible,” he wrote (Charbon 1991, 12). As a servant of the government, Foy 
was appalled by the notion that the French state could lose its monopoly over tele-
communications infrastructures. As Foy argued, “the existence of this telegraph 
communication would necessarily harm the present privilege of the government to 
be the first instructed of all-important news.” The government had to be the first 
one to see and learn about what was going on. But the fundamental belief expressed 
by Foy’s blunt refusal was that a privatised telecommunications infrastructure was 
a challenge that the modern state simply could not handle. All the techniques of 
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power – like surveillance and censorship – institutionalised since the 16th century 
in partnership with private actors to control the subversive effect of the printing 
press and of postal networks while allowing them to serve the interests of both the 
state and early capitalism would come crumbling down.
So over the next six years, the French administration worked on a plan to retain 
its monopoly over the deployment and exploitation of telegraph networks, while 
starting to open its use to the general public. In 1837, the Minister of the Interior, 
Adrien de Gasparin, appeared before the Parliament to defend a new law designed 
to put that plan into effect. The goal was to criminalise every transmission that was 
not authorised by the government and not sent over public telegraph lines.
But in many respects, Foy and Gasparin fought a rear-guard battle. As it had 
already done with older communication technologies, the state would soon move 
to a lighter-handed approach. From the 1840s on, the development of the electri-
cal telegraph accelerated national and transnational communications flows, as the 
industrial revolution spurred the demand for coordination and communications 
(Beniger 1986). By the end of the 19th century, private corporations did not only 
make extensive use of the telegraph and of the new communication technology 
of the time, the telephone; they also played a growing role in the construction 
and management of national and international infrastructures to serve the needs of 
states and globalising market actors (Barty-King 1980; Headrick 2012).
Fast-forward 150 years. Neoliberal policies launched in the 1980s have com-
pleted the dismantling of public and private monopolies over telecommunications 
networks, and digital technologies have profoundly intensified data flows. Once 
again, states have found ways to transpose their traditional techniques of power to 
digital communications (Galloway 2004; Goldsmith and Wu 2006). When they 
do – whether it is to engage in surveillance, censorship or propaganda – they almost 
always do so in interaction with companies who manage parts of the multi-layered 
architecture of the Internet.
In the process, actors who occupy key positions in the state’s intelligence and 
now law enforcement agencies have to constantly negotiate alliances with these 
private actors. Today, that means not only dealing with large firms in the media and 
telecom sectors whose relations to the security field can be traced back from the 16th 
and 19th centuries, but also with tech firms that have come to dominate the digital 
economy – mostly US-based multinational online service providers, software pro-
ducers and online platforms like Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft.
In other words, “Big Tech” joins “Big Media” and “Big Telco” as yet another 
oligopoly commanding over the all-important communication industries, and 
more generally the global economy. Today, Apple, Amazon, Google/Alphabet, 
Microsoft, and Facebook have acquired the highest market valuations globally 
(Statista 2018). Tech is now the largest sector in global capitalisation, amount-
ing to 3,582$bn, before financials (3,532$bn), consumer goods (2,660$bn), 
healthcare (2,300$bn), oil and gas (1,411$bn) or telecommunications (859$bn) 
(PwC 2017). Having championed new models based on the algorithmic regula-
tion of online communications as well as regimes of surveillance relying on the 
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systematic collection and analysis of behavioral data (Fuchs and Trottier 2015), 
these resourceful companies hold an irresistible appeal for security professionals 
tasked with controlling communication flows.
This, in turn, is leading to a historic shift in the public-private assemblages 
regulating communication networks, which actually points to a much wider trend 
in modern state power. In Seeing Like a State (1998), James C. Scott has shown 
how modern statecraft was built by ensuring legibility through measures, metrics 
and other “state simplifications” aimed at representing and acting upon both the 
natural and social worlds. In the age of Big Data, the techniques mastered by Big 
Tech are now seen as crucial to make the digitised world legible and governable. 
Faced with swelling data stocks and flows, the state needs to see like Big Tech. 
This gives way to a negotiation process aimed at co-opting its infrastructures and its 
data-processing techniques. Big Data governmentality hence spreads throughout 
the security field and beyond, across state bureaucracies.
Shifting public-private assemblages in the security field
To make sense of these ongoing negotiations, it is useful to start with the concept 
of security assemblages. With the rise of security privatisation in the context of neo-
liberal economics, the public-private category has become a key theme in security 
studies, with research on topics ranging from private security guards to the role of 
private companies in the logistics of military forces or subcontractors in the intel-
ligence field (Abrahamsen and Leander 2015; Williams 2010). But, against those 
insisting that the increasing role of private corporations in security is one more evi-
dence of the weakening of traditional state sovereignty, critical security scholars like 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2010, 23) have instead argued that “privatisation is not a 
challenge to prevailing structures of authority, but is embedded in, and inseparable 
from, transformations in governance.” Seeking to lay new theoretical foundations 
for understanding how private security is historically and socially constituted, the 
authors have introduced the concept of “global security assemblages”:
[Global security assemblages are] transnational structures and networks in 
which a range of different actors and normativities interact, cooperate and 
compete to produce new institutions, practices and forms of deterritorialized 
security governance.
(p. 90)
Against those authors who ground the concept of assemblage in the philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze (e.g. Haggerty and Ericson 2000), Abrahamsen and Williams 
instead anchor it in the Bourdieusian concept of “fields” to highlight the evolution 
of material, symbolic and cultural forms of capital within the security field. Their 
approach also builds on Saskia Sassen’s notion of “disassembly” to highlight the 
fact that an assemblage is actually a process whereby some components of states are 
configured in new power structures, as formerly public functions are transferred 
148 Félix Tréguer
to the private sector. “Security assemblage,” then, refer to the way security gov-
ernance is increasingly achieved through fluctuating arrangements of networks of 
state, corporate and other voluntary actors, which together form “knots of statelike 
power” (Harcourt 2015).
That the tech industry may play an important role in security assemblages may 
not be surprising. After all, from Charles Babbage’s proposal of an Analytical Engine 
to Alan Turing’s Enigma, the genealogy of computers clearly shows an immediate 
connection between the development of these technologies, and the needs of mod-
ern bureaucracies – whether public or private. Data processing tools associated with 
statistical work and calculation have historically played a key role in the modern state 
power (Agar 2003; Desrosières 2002). They have also long been a cornerstone of the 
military-industrial complex, as evidenced for instance by scholarship on the role of 
IBM in the Holocaust (Black 2012) or inquiries on the history of the Silicon Valley 
and its intimate relationship with the US military (Bellamy Foster and McChesney 
2014; Edwards 1996; Harris 2014; Lécuyer 2007; Levine 2018; Nesbit 2017).
But what makes ongoing negotiations between Big Tech and the security field 
particularly interesting is that this oligopoly also originates from a corporate culture 
marked by a “counter-culture libertarianism” (Barbrook and Cameron 1995) – 
one that has deep historical roots (Turner 2006). As a consequence, from the point 
of view of many stakeholders, these organisations first appeared as relative outsiders 
to the security field. As the process of hybridisation between the state and the new 
masters of communication industries unfolds and has yet to stabilise, the security 
field intersects with other social fields that traverse these organisations and are 
influenced by this counter-cultural, oppositional ethos – like the field of computer 
security or that of digital rights. For this reason, the incorporation of Big Tech in 
the state’s security apparatus is marked with intense power struggles that are often 
made visible, for instance through the media.
Post-Snowden: cooperation or resistance?
These struggles can provide key insights to understand data politics and modern 
state power. In recent research conducted on the surveillance of Internet com-
munications by intelligence agencies, we approached these issues by looking at 
the debates around Internet surveillance in the aftermath of the 2013 Snowden 
disclosures in the United States and in France (Tréguer 2018). By following inter-
actions between Big Tech and governments as they moved from surveillance to 
other issues of interest to the security field (such as the weakening of encryption or 
the fight against terrorist propaganda), we worked through an inductive approach 
to identify factors influencing how these profit-seeking entities and their manag-
ers would fall in the cooperation/resistance spectrum, depending on the changing 
context and constraints that they face across time and space.
Among the factors making up this constraint structure were a firm’s internal 
corporate culture, past and ongoing dealings with the human rights field (e.g. past 
human rights scandals affecting them), the importance of user trust and the threat 
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of competition. The relative weight of these constraints in a given context made 
resistance to the demands of the security field more likely. In turn, the sensitivity 
of these firms to regulatory changes, the identification of their managers to what 
Mills called the “power elite” (Mills 1959), their dependence on public funding 
and procurements, and the existence of criminal sanctions for non-cooperation all 
made cooperation more likely.
Looking at post-Snowden debates in the United States and in France to see how 
this constraint structure played out, we noticed some differences between the two 
countries from 2013 to 2015. In the US (and although these actions had global 
repercussions), we first see overt and multi-pronged resistance strategies being 
staged by Big Tech, whether through “technical resistance” with the roll-out of 
encryption on their products, or legal and political resistance through litigation and 
political advocacy aimed at reigning in the power of intelligence agencies.
In part, these can be read as instances of “double dealings” in the field of human 
rights defenders and that of hackers and engineers who were mobilised to beef up 
privacy protections in response to the Snowden disclosures. In Bourdieu’s research 
such double-dealings refer to situations “whereby leaders, managers, officials or 
delegates of a field appear to be acting in a disinterested or principled manner 
‘for the field' and its values but are actually serving their own interests” (Webb, 
Schirato, and Danaher 2002). By aligning themselves with the privacy claims of 
their own workers concerned about their incursion in the military-industrial com-
plex, the demands of human rights organisations and those of the field of computer 
security, these firms were able to remobilise workers, mitigate reputational risk and 
restore the trust of their users and customers concerned by the revelations, thereby 
securing or even reinforcing their market positions.
Encryption is a case in point. Whereas media coverage often over-emphasised 
the tensions between Big Tech and governments on this issue – for instance in 
2016 when Apple refused a request by the FBI to collaborate in order to bypass 
encryption on a iPhone used by the San Bernadino shooter – such legal resistance 
often simply came down to respecting the state of the art, as computer engineers 
across the world worked to draw the lessons of the Snowden disclosures and beef 
up computer security globally (Rogers and Eden 2017).
Big Tech did not go much further. When strong, end-to-end encryption 
was rolled-out, the companies often declined to make it a by-default option. It 
was the case with Facebook Messenger, Microsoft’s Skype or Google’s Allo. An 
FBI source reacted to the launch of Allo by saying that “having [strong encryp-
tion] as an opt-in feature is certainly useful to us” (as quoted in Nakashima and 
Tsukayama 2016). Even when they are used by default, the strong encryption fea-
tures like those deployed by Facebook on WhatsApp only encrypt the content of 
communications, not the metadata (who communicates with whom, when, from 
where, etc.). In other words, these deployments still allowed companies to mine 
metadata so as to monitor their users’ behaviour and serve them with targeted 
advertising. Of course, such metadata can be, and frequently is, handed over to 
law enforcement (e.g. Biddle 2016; Fox-Brewster 2017).
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Looking at these developments, some scholars have argued that the spread of 
encryption on Big Tech’s infrastructures – which, according to NSA officials, had a 
significant inhibiting effect on the surveillance capabilities of law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies (McLaughlin 2016) – can be seen as a way of ensuring that 
the surveillance of users’ communication could only happen with the companies’ 
knowledge and consent, thereby reinforcing their position in the security field 
(Rubinstein and Van Hoboken 2014).
These shortcomings may primarily be driven by business considerations, rather 
than result from direct negotiations between Big Tech and the security field. But 
in mid-2015, a White House memo on encryption contemplated the possibility of 
“voluntary assistance,” possibly in a “private” way to avoid the chilling effects that 
publicity might have on such cooperation (US National Security Council 2015). 
Since then, US intelligence and its allies have indeed exerted more quiet pressure 
to boost cooperation (e.g. Sanger and Frenkel 2018). We also know from the 
Snowden archives that prior to 2013, the NSA spent $250 million a year to work 
with tech companies to make commercial software – and in particular encryption 
software – more exploitable (Ball, Borger, and Greenwald 2013).
Surveillance reform and the Snowden paradox
When it comes to legal and political resistance staged by Big Tech, they too have 
their limits. The case of the US indeed confirms that despite an increased degree 
of transparency, surveillance reform introduced since 2013 in liberal regimes has 
led to what we have called the “Snowden paradox” (Tréguer 2017): Intelligence 
reform, rather than rolling-out capacities for large-scale and “suspicionless” sur-
veillance, has provided a detailed legal basis for these capacities, bringing a few new 
safeguards and decreasing the level of secrecy to secure their legality and legitimacy.
In the US, the most important piece of legislation in this respect was the USA 
Freedom Act, passed in June 2015. Rather than allowing the NSA to collect and 
store domestic telephone records in bulk, the legislation effectively gives that 
authority to telecommunication providers (who will have to query their own 
databases with selectors provided by the NSA and hand over the matching data). 
In no way did this stop the growth of large-scale surveillance conducted by US 
intelligence. According to the reports published by the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence in 2017 and 2018, the amount of data collected by the NSA 
has surged since 2013 (Gallagher 2017; Volz 2018), including the data collected 
from Big Tech (according to the Google Transparency Report, by virtue of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it provided data on 14,000 user accounts in 
the first semester of 2013; in the first half of 2017, that number rose to more than 
48,500 accounts – a 350% increase). Even legislative changes allowing companies 
to ask a judge to review gag orders attached to surveillance requests (preventing 
any public disclosure on the existence of such requests) have since been selectively 
used by companies like Google and Facebook, leading to criticisms from human 
rights organisations (Cardozo 2017).
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In France, US tech companies’ push for surveillance reform originally acted in 
a much more antagonist environment, partly resulting from existing public-private 
alliances with French telecom and defence firms and from repeated calls in favour 
of “digital sovereignty” by decreasing the dependency of the French security field 
on US companies. In fact, Big Tech’s initial attempt at resistance to the expansion 
of state surveillance capacities was immediately denounced by government officials 
as hypocritical, considering their own commercial surveillance practices. This sub-
sequently led to much less intense and more discreet forms of engagement when 
France expanded the surveillance powers of its intelligence agencies through this 
new legislation. As for the amount of data provided by Big Tech to the French 
police and judiciary in the past years, it has also sharply increased, in part due 
to a better compliance rate after a “group of contact” was established between 
technology companies and the Ministry of the Interior in 2015 (Cassini 2015). In 
the first half of 2013 (January–June), Google was served with 2,011 requests by 
French authorities (it complied with 49 % of them); Facebook was served with 
1,547 requests (39 % compliance rate). In the first half of 2017, Google received 
5,661 requests (it complied with 63 % of them); Facebook, 4,700 requests (74%). 
In four years, that makes for a 360% and 570% increase in the number of requests 
for which some data was produced, respectively.
Controlling data flows: A “fundamental shift” in  
“scale and nature”
After 2015 and save for a few exceptions, the influence of the human rights field 
on the global debate on surveillance reform withered along with media attention 
to state surveillance issues. Through securitisation discourses – where securitisation 
refers to speech acts calling for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the ter-
rorist threat (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 491) – the security agenda became dominated 
by the terrorist threat. This led to new calls on the part of the security field to limit 
encryption, boost surveillance capabilities, and fight against terrorist propaganda on 
online networks, often with the threat of new legislation and criminal sanctions if 
the companies failed to cooperate. In this context, similar trends towards greater 
cooperation materialised both in the US and Europe, suggesting strong transnational 
field effects across the Atlantic (Bigo 2016). Two topics are particularly illustrative.
One area of cooperation that will help increase the already impressive growth in 
data requests sent to Big Tech companies are ongoing reforms around extraterrito-
rial access to data. In March 2017, US President Donald Trump signed into law the 
CLOUD Act. This piece of legislation – first presented by the Department of Justice 
in mid-2016 – was added at the last minute to a spending bill to revise the legal 
framework regulating US law enforcement access to online data stored overseas as 
well as access to data by foreign law enforcement authorities to data held in the US.
The goal is to provide a streamlined legal avenue to bypass the often long 
and tedious procedures of international judicial cooperation provided by 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) (Vergnolle 2017) while clarifying 
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the extra-territorial effects of US law. With the CLOUD Act, if a country 
is deemed by the US government to have an adequate legal framework for 
surveillance, a bilateral agreement will be concluded giving to that country 
the possibility to directly send surveillance requests to US companies, without 
having to go through the US judiciary, even when the data is stored in the 
US. Conversely, US law enforcement agencies will be able to request any user 
data from US companies, regardless of the nationality of targeted persons and 
regardless of where the data is stored.
Drafted and passed with wide-ranging support from the tech sector (Smith B, 
2018; Walker 2017), the CLOUD Act further entrenches the privatisation of the 
justice system for regulating trans-border data flows. As a result of this legislation, 
tech companies who receive requests from a third country will be the only ones 
able to oppose these requests; with MLAT procedures, the whole process would 
have been supervised by foreign and US judges. It also gives new leverage to the US 
government – i.e. whether or not to conclude a bilateral agreement with foreign 
governments to give them direct access to the data troves of US companies – 
which may be abused to further the diplomatic interests of the US at the expense 
of human rights. These are just some of the most obvious problems of a legislation 
reaped with ambiguities (Singh Guiliani and Shah 2018; Wong 2017). In Europe, 
the adoption of the CLOUD Act was immediately followed by a proposal for a 
“directive on electronic evidence” aimed at enacting similar rules. Both initiatives 
could quickly expand worldwide through an ongoing revision of the Convention 
on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe.
In both the US and Europe, another hot topic has been that of terrorist propa-
ganda, and the intensifying pressure put on online service providers to police such 
speech. Since the Paris attacks of 2015 and a visit of the French Minister of the 
Interior to Silicon Valley, France has been the European leader in this push toward 
privatised censorship, which was quickly taken up at the level of the European 
Union. The European Commission and Europol have convened regular meet-
ings to get online platforms to sign a code on hate speech in 2016. In its report on 
the activity of its “Internet Referral Unit” created in 2015 to weed out extremist 
content online, Europol makes clear that these censorship activities are conducted 
outside of any legislative framework:
A referral activity (meaning the reporting of terrorist and extremist online 
content to the concerned online service provider) does not constitute an 
enforceable act. Thus, the decision and removal of the referred terrorist 
and extremist online content is taken by the concerned service provider 
under their own responsibility and accountability (in reference to their 
Terms and Conditions).
(Europol 2016, 4)
The US government followed suit in February 2016, when US Cabinet members 
and intelligence officials also met with tech companies. At the time, the White 
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House press secretary told reporters that “many of these technology companies that 
are participating in the meeting today are run by patriotic Americans and would 
want to cooperate” (as quoted in Jose and California 2016). A key aspect of the 
discussions laid in understanding how technology could be used to boost censor-
ship of terrorist propaganda and so-called counter-discourse. A few months later, 
companies like Google and Facebook were announcing major innovations in their 
efforts on extra-judicial automated censorship, something that the government 
could not do considering the “First amendment” issues raised by such policies 
(Menn and Volz 2016).
Of course, online censorship represents an important challenge considering the 
sheer volume of third-party content posted on these platforms: 300 hours of video 
are posted on YouTube every minute; and on Facebook, every day, 510,000 com-
ments are posted, 293,000 statuses are updated, and 136,000 photos are uploaded. 
So besides hiring thousands of content-moderators, often through subcontrac-
tors based in low-wage countries where basic social rights are discarded (Roberts 
2016), these efforts have led to significant investment in tools based on “Machine 
Learning” systems aimed at censoring terrorist-related content.
As the British Prime Minister Theresa May, explained at UN General Assembly 
in New York in September 2017:
Industry needs to go further and faster in automating the detection and 
removal of terrorist content online, and developing technological solutions 
which prevent it being uploaded in the first place. We need a fundamen-
tal shift in the scale and nature of our response – both from industry and 
governments.
(as quoted in Hope and McCann 2017)
A year later, in September 2018, the European Commission was announcing a 
proposal for transcribing the extra-judicial and automated mechanisms experi-
mented over the past years into EU law.
What is happening here, with these moves around extra-territorial access to 
data or the censorship of terrorist propaganda, is a major reconfiguration of secu-
rity assemblages tasked with the management of data flows and stocks, as new 
actors, technologies and regulations become necessary for the state to handle the 
surge in public and private communications entailed by digital technologies and 
keep its traditional techniques of power afloat. But the more we look at these 
new security assemblages involving Big Tech, the more we start to understand 
that they are but a sign of a broader reconfiguration of bureaucracies in the 
digital age.
Bureaucracies in the age of data governance
In her work on neo-liberal bureaucratisation, Béatrice Hibou has shown how, from 
the 1970s on, the logic of management migrated from the private realm to state 
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institutions (Hibou 2015). Through imperatives of “efficiency”, “cost-effectiveness”, 
“flexibility” and through practices of “auditing”, and “benchmarking”, bureaucratic 
practices within public administrations grew increasingly hostile to the post-war social 
values embedded in the public sector. With the so-called “New Public Management,” 
the abstract principles of neoliberalism were pushed so far as to cause a complete 
divorce between “efficiency” and the ends that state bureaucracies were supposed to 
pursue (Graeber 2015).
If, according Hibou, bureaucracy is seen “as a power concentrated in the 
hands of those who create the validated abstractions and put them at the core of 
government” (p. 86), it looks like Big Tech may fast be dominating the whole 
administrative field. Zuboff (2015) and others trace back the origin of this diffusion 
of power to Google’s popularisation of “data governance”, referring to bureau-
cratic models based on “data extraction and analysis”, “new contractual forms 
due to better monitoring”, “personalization and customization”, and “continuous 
experiments” championed by Google’s chief economist (Varian 2010, 2014). 
They were later relayed in the book How Google Works? (2015), authored by Eric 
Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Google/Alphabet from 2001 to 2017 and still a 
board member today, and Jonathan Rosenberg, a former Senior Vice President 
of Products at Google. In this book, the pair document business management les-
sons from Google, an experience that led them to “relearn everything” they knew 
through data-intensive models.
Data means knowledge means hard power
After having contributed to the shaping of US Internet diplomacy under the tenure 
of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Assange 2014; Powers and Jablonski 
2015; Schmidt and Cohen 2013), Eric Schmidt has been the most visible agent of 
a crowd of current and former “Googlers” helping spread these models at the heart 
of the US military-industrial complex. In March 2016, Schmidt was appointed by 
the Secretary of Defense as chairman of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB). A 
position as advisor to the Pentagon that he still holds at the time of writing despite 
him quitting his official positions at Alphabet/Google in January 2018. On its 
webpage, the DIB is described as an innovation think-tank:
Through pilot programs and experiments within DoD, the DIB can bring 
in new perspectives from the private sector and academia, work with DoD 
partners to test hypotheses, gather data, and encourage the imagination and 
critical thinking need to consider new solutions. This process is rapid, creative, 
collaborative, and ultimately saves time and money.
(DIB 2017)
In one of its recommendations entitled “Forge New Approach to Data 
Collection, Sharing, and Analysis”, the DIB insists on the importance of data to 
21st century statehood:
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Data is the 21st century equivalent of a global natural resource, like timber, 
iron, or oil previously – indispensable for sustaining military innovation and 
advantage. The next global conflicts will be fueled by data. The rapidly 
expanding power of new mathematical and computing techniques to reveal 
insights into intentions and capabilities, and to enhance accuracy, lethality, 
and speed, depend on immense data sets to train algorithms and from which 
to extract information. The data that provide the raw materials from which 
to identify patterns, as well as the anomalies that defy them, constitute the 
fuel that powers the engine of Machine Learning (ML). Whoever amasses 
and organises the most data first will sustain technological superiority, so it is 
incumbent upon the Department to collect, store, share, analyze, and protect 
its data faster and better than its competitors. Data must be regarded as one 
of the most powerful resources in the Department’s arsenal.
(DIB 2017)
Companies like Google and their executives are selling solutions aimed at expanding 
the technological superiority and “efficiency” of security bureaucracies. According 
Scott Frohman, Google’s Director of Defense and Intelligence Sales, Big Tech can 
bring these “radical innovations” at “ultra-low cost.” “Through the use of Google's 
capabilities remade for the enterprise,” he writes on his LinkedIn profile, “the gov-
ernment gets innovation fast and with significantly reduced cost” (Frohman 2018).
The “Startup Nation” as a new bureaucratic paradigm
These trends go beyond the security field and expand to virtually all public poli-
cies. The integration of Big Tech in the administrative and political fields has been 
going on for at least a decade. It vastly expanded under the Obama administra-
tion, with over 251 individuals changing position between Google or related firms 
and the federal government, national political campaigns and Congress (‘Google’s 
Revolving Door (US)’ 2017).
Under Trump, it may look different on the surface. For one thing, the tech 
industry has voiced strong criticism of his immigration and climate policies 
(Streitfeld, Isaac and Benner 2017). Big Tech workers have also played an impor-
tant role in denouncing Google’s participation to drone warfare. At Microsoft they 
opposed a $19.4 million contract with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), while Amazon was criticised for selling facial recognition technologies to 
US police forces. Trump has of course “trolled” Big Tech, for instance by accusing 
them of censoring conservative views online (Swisher 2018).
But in the back rooms, it looks like business as usual. In a memorandum signed 
in late-March 2017 creating the “American Technology Council,” Donald Trump 
opened new channels for sustaining the reciprocal influence between the tech 
industry and the US government. The initiative is overseen by his son-in-law and 
Senior Advisor Jared Kushner and seeks to “modernize” the US public sector. 
Discussions have touched on how to make public procurement more flexible, cut 
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down on some 6,000 government-owned data centres by shifting those responsi-
bilities to the private sector, or on the release government-held data on a range of 
issues, particularly on health care, for private-sector use (Romm 2017).
In France too, where a lot of revolving door activity is also happening (“Google’s 
European Revolving Door” 2016; Léchenet 2017), the debate on the “reform of 
the state” has moved from the premises of the New Public Management to those 
of data governance. By coining terms like “Startup Nation” – an expression cham-
pioned by French President Emmanuel Macron – or the “Platform State,” today’s 
reformers are re-modelling bureaucracies and decision-making processes around the 
need to produce massive amounts of data, make it available and usable, maintain its 
integrity and feed it to powerful data-processing tools that will be used to “optimise” 
bureaucratic outputs (e.g. Algan and Cazenave 2016; Bertholet and Létourneau 
2017; Pezziardi and Verdier 2017). Even when these reformist discourses claim to 
be opposing the hegemony of US tech companies, they are in fact assuming the 
superiority of their models and diffusing them across public administrations. It is 
an instance of “mimetic rivalry” (Girard 2002), where what Evgeny Morozov has 
termed solutionism serves as a new technocratic utopia (Morozov 2013).
Despite calls of security insiders and state reformers to establish “digital sover-
eignty,” the products and services of US tech firms continue to have an irresistible 
appeal. In 2017, a contract between Microsoft and the French Ministry of Defence 
was signed despite widespread criticism. A year earlier, the DGSI, France’s domestic 
intelligence, contracted Palantir, a Big Data analytics firm very close to US intelli-
gence, to mine the vast amount of data seized during house raids and digital seizures 
authorised under the state of emergency post-November 2015 (Tesquet 2017).
As this latter example suggests, new security assemblages do not only embark 
large tech firms used daily by billions of Internet users. Many small companies 
specialised in data analytics or vulnerabilities are also partnering with intelligence 
agencies to sell their products and services (Deibert 2013). Older tech and utility 
companies in the defence, transportation or energy sectors are also trying to catch 
up by investing in Big Data analytics – sometimes in partnership with their US 
competitors like IBM to secure access to key technologies – and are fast-developing 
solutions for Big Data policing, just as local elected officials hope to get votes by 
framing these new programs as advancing the project of a “Smart City.”
The Government Machine and the rule of law
Such trends towards technical, managerial and technological responses to security 
challenges have been sweeping the modern security field for quite some time now 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Bonelli 2010). But as Big Tech becomes part of 
the state and now serves the “Government Machine” (Agar 2003), we might be 
reaching a tipping point in the history of governmentality.
That being said, political theory suggests that the blurring public-private dis-
tinction is a feature of state power, not a bug. According to Timothy Mitchell, we 
need to see the state not “as a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, 
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organisation or structure, located apart from and opposed to another entity called 
society,” but rather as a multiplicity of political arrangements that produce struc-
tural effects that maintain social and political order (Mitchell 1991, 94). From this 
perspective, “the boundary of the state is merely the effect of such arrangements 
and does not mark a real edge. It is not the border of an actual object.” Rather, 
“producing and maintaining the distinction between state and society is itself a 
mechanism that generates resources of power.”
The “Big Tech vs. the Surveillance State” narrative emphasises that distinction. 
Post-2013, it served to counter that put forward by Snowden and journalists work-
ing on his disclosures of unabated and extra-legal cooperation. It helped reassure 
Internet users that these companies worked to protect their rights and resisted the 
state on their behalf. But soon enough, through more discreet moves, the state-
private distinction was again crushed when, to effectively control communications 
and avoid investing resources in the justice system, security professionals co-opted 
Big Tech and their censorship and surveillance techniques for their own ends. 
Such double-dealings are still ongoing.
Towards hybrid rule
Through public-private hybridisation, it becomes easier for governments to escape 
the important safeguards that our legal systems have developed over time to protect 
political rights, but which are apparently ill-suited (or at least too costly) to accom-
modate the surge in communications entailed by digital technologies. In this way, 
“political elites (. . .) rely on the private sector to shield national security activities,” 
thus “expanding state power while constraining democratic accountability” (Hurt 
and Lipschutz 2015, 2).
This was in part a deliberate strategy first envisioned in the mid-1990s, when 
security professionals – in particular at the Pentagon – feared the consequence of 
the compression of time and space induced by digital networks and sought for new 
ways of enacting state power. The result was the formulation of new doctrines and 
practices whereby “the military and law enforcement, the government and private 
industry, and domestic and foreign surveillance would necessarily mix in ways 
long seen as illicit if not illegal” (Jones 2017, 13). It followed that “constitutional 
interpretation, jurisdictional divisions, and the organisation of bureaucracies alike 
would need to undergo dramatic – and painful – change.”
As we have seen, part of such change resides in automation and extra-
judicialisation,which both lead to a profound shift in the history of the justice system. 
In his 1971–1972 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault explained how, from 
the 14th century on, the old feudal institution of Parliaments was gradually co-opted 
by the Crown and entrusted with investigative powers (Foucault 2018). To assert its 
power without having to bear the costs of military occupation, the Prince relied on 
Parliaments to interrogate people, to make them say what they knew so as to pro-
duce knowledge on the basis of which he would adjudicate and eventually govern 
“his” territory and the population.
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In today’s computerised world, the legal restrictions of state power that were 
progressively coded into the justice system are radically overtaken by “data gov-
ernance.” Digital traces form the basis of a new statistical power-knowledge that 
is seen as the most effective and cost-efficient way of governing the natural and 
social worlds. In the process, the legal norms and principles which somewhat 
circumscribed the power of the Prince get lost in computer code. Once it has mor-
phed into algorithms, power becomes even more diluted and harder to challenge 
(Rouvroy, 2012). Can we even reasonably hope to make these ever more com-
plex algorithms auditable, and their designers accountable, when experts in “Deep 
Learning” and “Neural Networks” say that even they cannot understand how 
these increasingly unpredictable systems work (Knight 2017; Smith, A. 2018)?
Stopping the machine?
That begs the question of how best to challenge these new security assemblages.
For one thing, it is worth stressing that Big Data bureaucracies might not be that 
good at doing what they are supposed to. We can therefore oppose the arguments 
of those legitimising these new governance models on the grounds of accuracy 
and reliability. There are reasons – and growing evidence – to doubt that the new 
“regimes of truth” championed by “Big Data security assemblages” will in any 
meaningful way provide solutions to security issues (Aradau and Blanke 2015). 
Technological solutionism in the age of data governance, bolstered by market-
ing discourses, might only be recreating a veil of illusion of technocratic control, 
while putting evermore distance between bureaucracies and the social world they 
wish to make more orderly. After all, history tells us, bureaucracies tend to fail. 
By disregarding “all the subtleties of real social existence,” “reducing everything 
to preconceived mechanical or statistical formulae,” bureaucratic dispositifs like 
“forms, rules, statistics, or questionnaire” – even when fuelled by complex algo-
rithms and troves of data –, remain abstract simplifications that might only reinforce 
the forms of structural violence they are said to alleviate or even solve (Graeber 
2015, p. 75; see also Eubanks 2018, O’Neil 2016).
Bureaucracies often fail to meet their alleged goals but still, they strengthen 
the power of those who invest in them. They transform the social world and can 
go awfully wrong (Scott 1998). If, following Tim Mitchell and critical security 
scholars, we refuse to “see the state and private organizations as a single, totalized 
structure of power,” another complementary way of resisting these assemblages 
is to build on the conflicts that inevitably occur “between different government 
agencies, between corporate organizations, and within each of them” (Mitchell 
1991, 90). We can amplify the words of those who denounce the oppressive 
and manipulative use of modern computer technologies, applaud tech work-
ers opposing the direct involvement of their company in the military-industrial 
complex, or support security professionals seeking to automate intelligence over-
sight so as to catch up with large-scale surveillance systems and mitigate abuse. 
We can, and we should.
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But post-Snowden controversies also show that these forms of resistance create 
a risk that we will overlook the pervasiveness of the institutions and technologies, 
of the rationalities and practices that created the problem in the first place. The risk 
is that all we are able to come up with are legal, technological or bureaucratic fixes 
to try to contain the most disturbing aspects of data-driven bureaucracies, without 
affecting the longer-term trend of a technological arms race that only seems to 
intensify the issues it was allegedly meant to solve.
Some kind of deeper resistance might be warranted. In his writings on power, 
Foucault once asked: “How can the growth of capabilities” – and he explicitly 
mentioned “techniques of communication – “be disconnected from the intensi-
fication of power relations?” (Foucault 1984, 48). Computing technologies have 
since become immensely powerful and yet, we are still struggling to find a satisfac-
tory answer to this crucial question. Despite the hopes of early hackers and Internet 
pioneers, the decoupling of technology and power is not happening. The key 
question then becomes whether technology itself or law or ethics can actually be 
effective instruments to achieve such decoupling.
At this stage of technological development, if we feel like they cannot – at least 
not in the near foreseeable future – that means it is probably time to refocus on 
tackling the imaginaries and institutions that underlie the “growth of capabilities” 
itself: the blind faith in technological progress; the oft-repeated mantra that technol-
ogy is neutral, that its negative potential will somehow be contained; places like the 
universities, R&D labs, ministries, start-ups, shops and factories where complex and 
powerful technologies are designed, produced and traded. As philosopher Jacques 
Ellul observed, “we set huge machines in motion in order to arrive nowhere” 
(Ellul 1989, 51). If it is not Thomas More’s eu-topia (“no place”) that we are fast 
approaching but rather a “dystopian void” (The Luddbrarian 2018), what we need 
is not just a technological fix, a bureaucratic patch, a principled law or even a good 
ethics; what we need first and foremost is to get off and stop the machine.
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